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This paper investigates the impact of federal extramural research funding on total expenditures for
life sciences research and development (R&D) at U.S. universities, to determine whether federal R&D
funding spurs funding from non-federal (private and state/local government) sources.  We use a fixed
effects instrumental variable approach to estimate the causal effect of federal funding on non-federal
funding.  Our results indicate that a dollar increase in federal funding leads to a $0.33 increase in non-federal
funding at U.S. universities.   Our evidence also suggests that successful applications for federal funding
may be interpreted by non-federal funders as a signal of recipient quality:  for example, non-PhD-granting
universities, lower ranked universities and those that have historically received less funding experience
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Federal agencies spend billions of taxpayer dollars funding academic research each year.  
Funding for academic research, especially in the life sciences, has risen rapidly over the last 
decade. In 2007, total federal obligations for research and development (R&D) at academic 
institutions totaled over $25 billion, of which $15.5 billion was provided by the National 
Institutes of Health (NIH), primarily to support basic and applied research in the biomedical 
sciences.
1 The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) provided an 
additional $8.2 billion to NIH to fund extramural life sciences R&D. The oft-cited justification 
for this level of public expenditure is that publicly-funded biomedical research results in better 
medical treatments and even preemption of disease (National Institutes of Health, 2008).  Under 
ARRA, increases in federal funding for biomedical research are further justified as a means to 
speed economic recovery, by increasing overall spending and employment opportunities.   
However, despite these laudable aims, economic theory suggests that federal funding for R&D 
could “crowd out” investment by fully-informed non-federal funders, thereby reducing its 
effectiveness. 
Increased federal investment could also cause individual investigators at universities to 
substitute among funding sources.  Because applying for funding is a costly activity, and because 
increases in income may reduce the perceived utility of additional funds, an increase in 
universities' federal funding might make them less inclined to pursue other funding sources.  For 
either or both of these reasons, a dollar increase in federal funding could yield less than a dollar 
increase in total R&D. 
On the other hand, private and public funding could be complements instead of 
substitutes. For example, by subsidizing investment in capital or equipment, or by supporting skill development, federal funding might increase the productivity of a university, making it 
more competitive in the market for non-federal research funding. If funding sources are 
complementary, a dollar increase in federal funding would increase total R&D by more than a 
dollar. 
Even if federal funding does not directly improve productivity, it may serve as a signal of 
university quality. For example, due to the extensive peer review conducted by the NIH and 
other federal agencies, non-federal funders seeking university partners may view successful 
applications for federal funding as a signal of university quality.  One might therefore expect a 
stronger signaling effect at universities with less established research reputations, about which 
potential non-federal investors have less information. In this case, a dollar increase in federal 
funding should again yield more than a dollar increase in total funding for R&D, but with larger 
effects at universities with smaller research portfolios and less established reputations.  
Finally, it is possible that federal dollars may be the sole source of financial support for 
some types of R&D, and thus neither substitute for nor complement private R&D funding.  For 
example, some have argued basic science is a public good, and would therefore be underfunded 
by private sources.  If this were the only effect operating, in the short run one would expect 
changes in federal funding to have no impact on non-federal funding: that is, a dollar increase in 
federal funding would simply increase total R&D funding by one dollar. 
In this paper, we estimate the causal effect of federal funding on non-federal funding for 
life sciences R&D at U.S. universities and colleges.  Our empirical models account for potential 
bias due to university characteristics that could be associated with both higher federal and higher 
non-federal funding, such as the number and quality of faculty, supportiveness of the university 
research environment, and the institution's reputation. This question of whether federal funding substitutes for or complements other funding 
has been previously studied in the literature. For example, David et al. (2000) reviewed literature 
on government-issued contracts to the private sector and policies such as R&D tax credits, and 
found mixed results: some studies suggested public R&D complements private R&D, while 
others found that public R&D crowds out private R&D.  Our research differs from the studies 
reviewed by David et al. (2000) in that we focus on university recipients, and the extent to which 
public (federal) R&D funding impacts R&D funding received from all non-federal sources.   
However, despite these differences, the warnings in David et al. (2000) about latent omitted 
variables and selection bias are relevant to our work.  Diamond (1999) used aggregate, annual 
time series data from 1953-1995 to study the connection between federal and private spending on 
basic research in science, and found that a dollar increase in federal spending was associated 
with an additional $0.08 in academic spending.  Like David et al. (2000), Diamond (1999) 
cautions the reader about omitted latent variables, but he does not apply any econometric 
correction. 
Some more recent studies have used instrumental variables and regression discontinuity 
designs to address the omitted variables issue.  For example, Payne (2001) and Payne and Siow 
(2003) use instrumental variables to investigate the possible causal relationships between federal 
funding and (a) philanthropic funding, and (b) research outcomes, including patents and 
publications.  Payne (2001) finds, when restricting observations to years post-1980, that a dollar 
increase in federal research funding increases private donations by $0.64 to $0.68, with no 
significant difference between private and public universities.  Payne and Siow (2003) find that a 
$1 million (1996 dollars) increase in federal funding to a university yields 10 more publications 
and 0.2 patents.  In contrast, using a regression discontinuity design, Jacob and Lefgren (2007) find only modest increases in publication productivity for recipients of NIH R01 research project 
grants, which they suggest may be due to substitution: on the margin, loss of an NIH grant 
simply causes researchers to shift to another source of funding.  
Our work complements prior research by exploring a mechanism through which federal 
biomedical research funding might influence eventual commercialization (i.e., by attracting 
complementary funding from private sources), and extends Payne (2001) to consider other non-
federal funding sources besides philanthropic donations. In addition, we construct a new 
instrument that allows us to infer causality despite the presence of unobserved variables that may 
impact both federal and non-federal funding at a given university over time. Finally, our paper 
contributes to the existing literature by examining the particular case of federal life sciences 
funding (mainly originating from the NIH), highlighting heterogeneous effects across 
universities with differing characteristics, and extending earlier work with more current data 
from a variety of sources.   
To address potential omitted variable bias, we estimate an instrumental variable (IV) 
model with university fixed effects, using predicted NIH funding as an instrument for federal life 
sciences funding.  To generate this instrumental variable, we first calculate the share of each 
university's R&D funding awarded by each NIH Institute or Center (NIC) in the base year of our 
analysis.  Because each of the NICs specializes in particular diseases, areas of human 
development, or aspects of research support (see Smith (2006)), each university's distribution of 
base-year funding across NICs reflects its particular research specialization.  We then predict the 
total NIH funding each university receives in subsequent years based on year-to-year changes in 
the budgets of the individual NICs, assuming that the university's relative specialization, i.e., the 
share of funding it receives from each NIC, remains constant throughout the study period.  We use this predicted NIH funding variable as an instrument for actual funding in our empirical 
analysis. 
The challenge in implementing the IV estimator is to find an instrument that is strongly 
correlated with changes in federal research funding at universities, but is uncorrelated with other 
types of shocks that might affect non-federal funding.  Because year-to-year appropriations for 
the different NICs are determined via political processes, the predicted funding levels described 
above are unlikely to be related to changes in other factors that drive a particular university's 
research capabilities and, therefore, its likelihood of receiving non-federal funding.  We present 
results from several tests of this assumption.  For example, we find no correlation between year-
to-year variation in NIC budgets and contemporaneous variation in related industry R&D. We 
also find no relationship between the share of funding universities received from each NIC and 
other observable characteristics associated with higher non-federal R&D.  The results we report 
here are also robust to changes in calculation of predicted NIH funding, such as using an earlier 
base-year to calculate NIC shares.  Predicted NIH funding is therefore a useful instrument for the 
total federal life sciences R&D funding a university receives, and allows us to attribute causality 
to federal life sciences and NIH funding. 
We find that an additional dollar of federal funding for life sciences research increases 
non-federal R&D funding by $0.33.  The point elasticity (at the average) for non-federal funding 
to lagged federal funding is 0.51. Our results also indicate that non-PhD-granting universities 
and those that have historically received less funding from all sources may experience greater 
increases in non-federal funding for each federal dollar.  This suggests successful applications 
for federal funding may be interpreted by non-federal funders as a signal of university quality. 2.  Data and Identification Strategy 
2.1  Data Sources 
Data for this paper are derived from two sources: the National Science Foundation (NSF) 
Survey of Research and Development Expenditures at Universities and Colleges, and 
administrative records maintained by the Office of Extramural Research at NIH. 
The NSF Survey population includes institutions granting bachelors or higher degrees in 
science and engineering (S&E) fields, and spending at least $150,000 annually in S&E research 
and development (R&D).  Surveyed institutions report their S&E R&D expenditures by funding 
source and field.  For example, these data include the amount of life sciences R&D funding 
received from federal versus non-federal (industry, state and local government, institutional, or 
other) sources.  For this analysis, we extracted universities' total and federally-funded R&D 
expenditures by year and field for 1998 through 2006.  Our dependent variable, non-federal life 
sciences R&D funding, was calculated by subtracting federally-funded life sciences R&D 
expenditures from total life sciences R&D expenditures.  Our key explanatory variable is 
federally-funded life sciences R&D expenditures, lagged by one year, and is also derived from 
this survey.  Life sciences R&D includes research in agricultural, biological, and medical 
sciences, as well as allied health professions; however, since 1998 over half of academic R&D 
expenditures in the life sciences have been for medical research, and this share has continued to 
grow over time.  Finally, for some models we include covariates for universities' federally- and 
non-federally funded R&D in fields other than life sciences.  To generate these covariates, we 
subtract life sciences R&D from total R&D expenditures to calculate non-life-sciences R&D 
expenditures for each institution-year.  Our dataset also includes other institutional characteristics, such as whether the institution is public or private, and whether it grants PhDs in 
S&E fields.  These additional characteristics allow us to explore possible signaling effects. 
NIH administrative data for each grant and contract awarded in fiscal years 1997 through 
2006 include the grant or contract unique ID number, the fiscal year of the award, principal 
investigator's institution (including institution name, city, and state), and the financial amount of 
the award.
2  As discussed in section 2.2, we use NIH award data from 1997 to calculate 
universities' base-year funding shares by NIC.  We also use subsequent years' data in a 
regression predicting non-federal funding as a function of actual NIH awards.  This measure 
differs from our key explanatory variable in that, while NIH is the lead federal agency funding 
academic life sciences research, universities may also receive life sciences R&D funding from 
other federal agencies, such as the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) or Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA).  In addition, although most NIH extramural R&D funding supports basic 
and applied life sciences research, NIH also funds research in other fields.  Thus, though actual 
NIH funding is strongly correlated with universities' total life sciences R&D expenditures, for 
consistency we rely on the NSF Survey data for our dependent and key explanatory variables. 
We matched institutions across these two datasets in an iterative process.  First, we found 
all exact matches by institution name and state.  Then, we extracted all remaining awardees in 
the NIH data that were coded as institutions of higher education, and matched these institutions 
by hand with those listed in the NSF survey.  Finally, we included in our analytic dataset only 
those institutions for which NSF survey data were available for each year in our study period, 
1998-2006, and for which NIH awards were observed in the administrative data in 1997, which 
limited our dataset to 272 institutions. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for our analytic dataset.  Approximately one-third 
of the 272 institutions in our panel are private, and over three-quarters grant PhDs in S&E fields.  
On average, about 60% of university R&D expenditures were funded by the federal government 
(62% for life sciences, and 60% for other fields).   
 Figure 1 shows the differences in growth for federal and non-federal life sciences R&D 
funding for our panel.  From 1998 through 2001, university life sciences R&D funding from both 
sources grew at about the same rate, but in subsequent years, federal funding outpaced non-
federal funding.  In 2006, the universities in our panel spent over $25 billion on life sciences 
R&D, representing approximately 87% of the national total.
3  
Table 1:  Descriptive statistics for university R&D expenditure data 
Variable Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Federal Funding for Life Sciences  46.8  74.8 
Non-Federal Funding for Life Sciences  28.5  44.4 
Federal Funding for Other Fields  31.2  51.0 
Non-Federal Funding for Other Fields   21.1  33.1 
PhD-Granting Institutions 77.9% 
Private Institutions 31.6% 
Number of Institutions  272 
Note: Author's calculations based on data from National Science Foundation (NSF) Survey of 
Research and Development Expenditures at Universities and Colleges.  All amounts reported 
in constant 2006 dollars, inflated using the Biomedical Research and Development Price 
Index (BRDPI).  Percent of institutions granting PhDs in S&E fields based on institution's 
highest degree granted in 1997.  Reported standard deviations are calculated between panel 
institutions. 
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2.2  Empirical Methods 
We employ several empirical strategies to estimate the relationship between federal and 
non-federal R&D funding at universities.  For all analyses, the unit of observation is the 
university-year, and standard errors are clustered at the university level to accommodate serial 
correlation.  We first conduct descriptive analyses to examine the association between federal 
and non-federal funding for life sciences at research universities.  Then, we estimate four 
different sets of multivariate linear regression models to investigate the possibility of a causal 
relationship between federal and non-federal R&D funding.  Each set of multivariate regression 
models incrementally controls for observed and unobserved university characteristics that could 
bias our estimates of the causal relationship between federal and non-federal funding. 
Our first regression estimates the simplest model: 
   (1) 
where Federalu,t-1 is the real, lagged federal funding for life sciences R&D at university u in year 
t - 1; NonFederalu,t is the real non-federal funding for life sciences at university u in year t, τ is a 
vector of year fixed effects that non-parametrically controls for secular changes in non-federal 
funding over time (e.g., due to changes in economic conditions); α0 is a constant; and εu,t is the 
error term.  The key coefficient of interest is α1, which estimates the change in non-federal 
funding associated with a dollar increase in federal funding the previous year.  We have two 
reasons for using lagged federal funding as our key independent variable.  First, as discussed in 
Section 1, we anticipate that any true crowd-in (or crowd-out) effect should be due to 
information about changes in federal funding that non-federal funders observe.  Because non-
federal funders cannot observe concurrent public funding decisions, we lag all federal funding by 
one year.  Second, lagging federal funding insulates us, to a certain extent, from exogenous 
t u t u t u Federal NonFederal , 1 , 1 0 , ε τ α α + + + = −shocks that might increase both federal and non-federal funding (e.g., increased interest in 
funding for a particular disease in which the university has specialized, university hiring of new 
senior faculty, etc.) in a given year. 
However, as discussed in Section 1, α1 may nonetheless suffer from omitted variables 
bias.  For example, universities with more faculty members or stronger research reputations may 
attract both greater federal and greater non-federal funding.  These omitted variables would yield 
a positive association between federal and non-federal funding, even if no causal relationship 
exists.  Thus our estimate of α1 is likely to be biased upward due to this spurious correlation, 
because the model does not control for university characteristics.  Our second regression model 
addresses this source of bias.  We estimate: 
   (2)   
where μ is a vector of university fixed effects that control for all time-invariant differences across 
universities.  In contrast to equation (1) which exploited variation in funding levels both across 
and within universities, this model exploits only the variation within individual universities' prior 
year federal funding to estimate the effect on non-federal funding.  In effect, this model estimates 
whether a university that received more federal funding (relative to its average over the study 
period) in year t received increased (or decreased) non-federal funding in year t+1.  In this 
specification, β1 could be biased if time-varying university characteristics are correlated with 
growth (or decline) in federal and non-federal funding.  For example, as discussed by Lawler 
(2003), growth in non-federal (i.e., industry) funding at top research universities such as the 
University of California at Berkeley and MIT may reflect strategic initiatives by university 
administration to diversify funding sources.  If increased federal fundraising activity occurred at 
t u t u t u Federal NonFederal , 1 , 1 0 , ε μ τ β β + + + + = −the same time, we might erroneously conclude that federal funding caused growth in non-federal 
funding. 
Our third regression model is designed to control for additional bias arising from such 
time-varying university characteristics, by including the amounts of federal and non-federal 
funding the university received for other S&E fields: 
   (3) 
In this model, we include lagged federal funding for other fields because overall university 
reputation (not just within biomedical sciences) as captured by total federal funding may 
influence non-federal funding decisions, particularly for complementary research.  Inclusion of 
same-year non-federal funding for other fields allows us to control for year-to-year differences in 
the extent to which universities seek non-federal funding.  Because university policy with respect 
to non-federal funding is likely to be correlated with university quality, excluding these effects 
could likewise yield biased estimates of γ1. 
Finally, we use instrumental variables (IV) estimation to account for other observed and 
unobserved time-varying university characteristics that might bias our coefficients.  Our 
instrument for federal life sciences R&D funding is predicted NIH funding.  Predicted NIH 
funding is calculated based on the share of a given university's funding received from each NIC 
in our base year, and the overall growth (or decline) in each NIC's budget each year.   
Specifically, predicted NIH funding is given by:     
  b u i
i b i
t i
b u t u share
Budget
Budget
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=  (4) 
where NIHu,b is the actual NIH funding for university u in our base year, 1997; Budgeti,t is the total 
annual budget for NIH institute i in year t; and sharei,u,b is the share of total funding from NIC i for 
university u in base year b.  Equation (4) shows that growth in a given university's predicted NIH 
t u t u t u t u t u d OtherNonFe OtherFed Federal NonFederal , , 3 1 , 2 1 , 1 0 , ε γ γ μ τ γ γ + + + + + + = − −funding is equal to the weighted average growth across NIC budgets, where weights reflect the 
university's share of funding from each NIC in the base year.  We then estimate the following IV 
model using two-stage least squares: 
   (5)   
    (6) 
Our decision to analyze the effects of absolute rather than percent changes (i.e., the 
decision not to log-transform the dependent and independent financial amounts) was based on 
three observations.  First, the large number of institution-years with no federal and/or non-federal 
R&D funding for S&E fields would require us to drop nearly a hundred universities from our 
panel (decreasing the number from 272 to 179).  Ad-hoc methods to deal with this problem, such 
as replacing all zero values with $1 or $1000, yield results which strongly depend on the choice 
of replacement value.  Second, exclusion of institutions with historically low levels of funding 
from either source is counterproductive because we are particularly interested in evaluating the 
possibility that successful applications for federal funding provide a signal of quality to non-
federal funders.  The 179 institutions that do receive funding in all years are overwhelmingly 
PhD-granting (93% vs. 78% in the full panel), and are somewhat more often public than private 
(72% vs. 68% in the full panel). As one would expect, they also have higher average federal and 
non-federal funding for both life- and non-life sciences, thus are unlikely to permit an 
examination of signaling effects. Finally, to the extent that variance in the errors increases with 
funding levels, heteroskedasticity in the linear model can be accommodated simply by our 
calculation of robust standard errors.
4,5 
t u t u t u t u t u deral OtherNonFe al OtherFeder NIH Federal , , 3 , 2 , 1 0 , ς μ τ θ θ θ θ + + + + + + =
t u t u t u t u t u deral OtherNonFe al OtherFeder Federal NonFederal . , 3 1 , 2 1 , 1 0 , ε μ τ δ δ δ δ + + + + + + = − −3.  Results 
3.1  Full Sample Effects 
Table 2 shows the results from our multivariate regressions.  The dependent variable in 
each case is non-federal life sciences R&D funding, and the key independent variable is federal 
life sciences R&D funding.  The results from model 1 (corresponding to equation (1)) show that 
a dollar increase in federal life sciences funding is associated with a $0.47 increase (p<.001) in 
non-federal life sciences funding.  However, as discussed above, the lack of any controls for 
university characteristics in this model likely bias this estimate upwards.  For example, 
universities with larger faculties and/or reputations for higher quality research might receive both 
more federal and more non-federal funding for life sciences R&D.  To address this concern, 
subsequent models include university fixed effects to control for time invariant university 
characteristics.  Results from model 2 (corresponding to equation (2)) show that after controlling 
for time invariant university characteristics and secular time trends, a dollar increase in federal 
funding for life sciences R&D is associated with a $0.31 increase (p<.001) in non-federal 
funding for life sciences R&D.  Model 3 (corresponding to equation (3)) adds covariates for 
federal and non-federal R&D funding in other fields, to control for unobserved time-varying 
university characteristics.  For example, as discussed in section 1, during our sample period a 
given university's administration might have pushed for diversification in the university's funding 
portfolio, or a smaller university might have transitioned from a more teaching-focused to a more 
research-focused institution.  Results from this model indicate that a dollar increase in federal 
funding for life sciences R&D is associated with a $0.29 increase (p<.001) in non-federal life 
sciences R&D funding.  As one would expect, in this model we find no significant impact of 
federal R&D funding for other fields (i.e., non-life-sciences) on non-federal life sciences R&D. Model 4 (corresponding to equations (4) through (6)) presents the results from our 
instrumental variables approach, showing that a dollar increase in federal funding leads to a 
$0.33 increase (p<0.001) in non-federal life science R&D funding.  The Durbin-Wu-Hausman 
null hypothesis states that an ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator of the same equation would 
yield consistent estimates; our results soundly reject consistency of the OLS estimator (p<0.01).  
Our results also show that predicted NIH funding is a strong predictor of federal life sciences 
funding, with a F-statistic for the first-stage regression of 244.32.  
 
Table 2:  Effect of federal R&D funding on non-federal R&D funding for life sciences at U.S. 
universities 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Federal Funding for Life Sciences  0.47  0.31  0.29  0.33 
  [9.18]*** [5.91]*** [5.98]*** [4.21]*** 
Year == 2000  1681.39 1971.78 1648.71 1,595.50 
  [3.95]*** [4.50]*** [3.78]*** [3.66]*** 
Year == 2001  2448.39 3228.46 2620.66 2,452.62 
  [4.00]*** [4.71]*** [4.29]*** [4.23]*** 
Year == 2002  2867.33 4135.11 3268.36 3,000.18 
  [4.25]*** [5.24]*** [4.61]*** [4.44]*** 
Year == 2003  2409.60 4439.87 3390.61 2,989.08 
  [3.43]*** [5.26]*** [4.32]*** [3.63]*** 
Year == 2004  248.42 3083.74  2058.11  1,514.71 
 [0.30]  [4.00]***  [2.53]**  [1.50] 
Year == 2005  395.26 3928.77  2760.89  2,076.97 
 [0.42]  [4.63]***  [3.08]***  [1.66]* 
Year == 2006  1841.05 5560.91 4201.87 3,479.14 
 [1.73]*  [5.25]***  [3.92]***  [2.47]** 
Federal Funding, Other Fields      0.08  0.06 
     [1.28]  [0.86] 
Non-Federal Funding, Other Fields      0.30  0.29 
     [2.12]**  [2.05]** 
Observations  2176 2176 2176 2176 
Number of institutions  272  272  272  272 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Robust t statistics in brackets 
Results from multivariate regression with non-federal life sciences funding as the dependent variable, 
and with the university-year as unit of observation.  All federal funding amounts are lagged one year.  
Model 1 includes year fixed effects (shown); Model 2 adds university fixed effects.  Model 3 adds 
controls for non-life-sciences funding received by the university.  Model 4 uses lagged predicted NIH 
funding as an instrument for federal life sciences funding, while also including year fixed effects and 
controls for non-life-sciences funding received by the university. 3.2  Effects of University Heterogeneity 
In this section, we investigate how effects of federal funding differ by the following 
university characteristics: (1) tercile of non-federal life sciences R&D funding received in the 
base year (1998), (2) tercile of federal life sciences R&D funding received in the base year 
(1998), (3) PhD versus non-PhD-granting status, (4) private versus public institutional control, 
and (5) whether the institution was ranked among the top 50 research universities by U.S. News 
& World Report.  All forty of the institutions in our panel that ranked among the top 50 in U.S. 
News & World Report at some point during our sample period are PhD-granting institutions, 25 
are private, 27 are in the top tercile for non-federal life sciences R&D funding, and 33 are in the 
top tercile for federal life sciences R&D funding. 
Table 3 columns (2) through (4) show results of IV regressions by tercile of non-federal 
life sciences funding in 1998, the first year of our panel.  Federal life sciences R&D funding 
leads to a statistically significant increase in non-federal funding for universities in all three 
terciles.  The greatest effect appears to be in the lowest tercile: for universities that historically 
have received relatively low non-federal R&D funding for the life sciences, a dollar increase in 
federal funding yields a $0.53 increase in non-federal funding, compared with $0.16 and $0.23 
for the second and third terciles. 
Columns (5) through (7) report results of IV regressions by tercile of federal life sciences 
funding in 1998.  We again find federal life sciences R&D funding is associated with a 
statistically significant increase (p<.10) in non-federal funding for universities in all three 
terciles, and again the greatest effect seems to be in the lowest tercile: for universities that 
historically received relatively low federal R&D funding for the life sciences, a dollar increase in federal funding yields an estimated $0.91 increase in non-federal funding, compared with $0.54 
and $0.21 for the higher two terciles. 
Table 4 columns (2) and (3) show results by highest degree granted.  The effects of 
federal funding are much larger for universities granting only Masters or Bachelors degrees 
versus those awarding PhDs in S&E fields.  While a dollar increase in federal life sciences R&D 
funding at a PhD-granting institution is associated with a $0.32 increase in non-federal funding, 
for institutions that do not grant a PhD, a dollar increase in federal funding yields a $1.10 
increase in non-federal funding.  This difference is statistically significant (α=.05). 
In columns (4) and (5), we report results for public versus private universities.  At public 
universities, a dollar increase in federal life sciences R&D funding is associated with a $0.41 
increase in non-federal funding, whereas at private universities a dollar increase in federal life 
sciences R&D funding is associated with a $0.25 increase in non-federal funding. 
Finally, in columns (6) and (7), we find the non-federal funding response seems also to 
be greater for universities not among the top 50 in the U.S. News and World Report rankings.  
For these universities, a dollar increase in federal life sciences R&D funding yields only a $0.19 
increase in non-federal funding.  For all other universities (including top-ranked liberal arts 
colleges), the effect appears to be higher: a dollar increase in federal life sciences R&D funding 
yields a $0.46 increase in non-federal funding.  
Table 3:  Heterogeneous effects of federal funding by base-year levels of federal and non-
federal funding 




  Tercile 1  Tercile 2  Tercile 3  Tercile 1  Tercile 2  Tercile 3 
Federal Funding for 
Life Sciences R&D  0.53  0.16  0.23  0.91  0.54  0.21 
 [1.85]*  [3.77]***  [1.87]*  [1.86]* [3.33]***  [1.48] 
Federal R&D Funding, 
Other Fields  -0.03  -0.02  0.05  -0.09  -0.01  0.08 
 [0.54]  [0.57]  [0.53]  [0.92]  [0.33]  [0.85] 
Non-Federal R&D 
Funding, Other Fields  0.03  0.02  0.58  0.03  0.09  0.32 
 [2.70]***  [0.54]  [3.40]***  [1.83]* [2.21]** [1.70]* 
Year==2000  136.76 602.90  4,380.07 152.52  263.86 5,203.58 
 [1.11]  [3.20]***  [3.06]***  [1.22] [0.78]  [3.68]*** 
Year==2001 -75.29  1,108.47 7,506.69  -40.91  721.86  8,608.93 
 [0.84]  [3.92]***  [3.99]***  [0.60] [1.54]  [4.09]*** 
Year==2002 -51.76  1,284.63 9,569.95  -51.06  803.94  11,082.10 
 [0.55]  [3.82]***  [3.84]***  [0.45] [1.60]  [3.89]*** 
Year==2003 -15.05  1,946.86 10,501.97 -35.66  580.87  12,562.27 
 [0.27]  [4.60]***  [2.88]***  [0.52] [0.99]  [2.97]*** 
Year==2004 -54.39  1,785.99 8,593.12  -34.32  197.10  9,945.27 
 [1.04]  [3.50]***  [1.70]*  [0.43] [0.25]  [1.67]* 
Year==2005 15.52  2,485.34 11,549.68 -20.89  -228.73  12,883.80 
 [0.23]  [4.66]***  [1.90]*  [0.27] [0.24]  [1.76]* 
Year==2006 -52.29  3,267.04 15,484.97 -75.82  279.24  17,163.11 
 [0.59]  [5.29]***  [2.34]**  [0.89] [0.24]  [2.14]** 
Observations  720 736  720  720  736 720 
Number of Institutions  90 92  90  90  92 90 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Robust t-statistics in brackets below each coefficient estimate. 
Results from instrumental variable regressions with non-federal life sciences funding as the dependent 
variable, and with the university-year as unit of observation.  All federal funding amounts are lagged one 
year.  All models include year fixed effects (shown) and university fixed effects. Standard errors are robust 
to heteroskedasticity and clustered on university. 
  
Table 4:  Heterogeneous effects of federal funding by highest degree granted, institutional 
control, and U.S. News & World Report ranking 
  Highest Degree Granted  Control  Rank 
 PhD  Other  Private  Public  Top  50  Other 
Federal Funding for 
Life  Sciences  R&D  0.32 1.05  0.25 0.41 0.19 0.46 
   [3.87]***  [11.33]***  [5.83]*** [3.04]*** [1.77]*  [3.69]*** 
Federal R&D Funding, 
Other  Fields  0.07 -0.04 0.05 0.00 0.09 0.08 
    [0.94] [0.41]  [0.76] [0.02] [0.98] [0.83] 
Non-Federal R&D 
Funding,  Other  Fields  0.30 0.07  0.24 0.30 0.68 0.17 
   [2.02]** [1.12]  [1.65]  [1.81]* [2.59]**  [1.38] 
Year==2000 2,079.57 -249.65  358.82  2,172.12 5,341.85 930.71 
   [3.74]*** [0.62]  [1.00]  [3.52]*** [2.86]*** [2.32]** 
Year==2001  3,231.64 -500.67  855.82  3,163.80 6,379.31 1,544.15 
   [4.37]*** [0.98]  [1.30]  [3.92]*** [2.40]**  [3.50]*** 
Year==2002  3,868.08 -133.41  818.62  3,984.31 7,474.08 1,865.90 
   [4.44]*** [0.30]  [1.25]  [4.09]*** [2.30]**  [3.35]*** 
Year==2003  3,791.71 -48.87  1,023.60 3,809.91 7,368.01 1,585.03 
   [3.44]*** [0.18]  [1.37]  [3.14]*** [1.89]*  [2.20]** 
Year==2004  2,045.65 -1,035.44 -1,017.87  2,548.96 2,776.16 631.40 
   [1.47] [2.29]**  [1.01] [1.75]* [0.54]  [0.63] 
Year==2005  2,763.35 -1,058.84 914.72  2,360.31 7,286.66 241.56 
   [1.60] [2.25]**  [1.21] [1.22] [1.18] [0.18] 
Year==2006  4,426.00 -303.23  1,801.19 3,966.84 8,629.00 1,819.57 
   [2.28]** [0.91]  [2.20]** [1.83]* [1.21]  [1.37] 
Observations 1,696.00  480  688  1488  320  1856 
Number of Institutions  212  60  86  186  40  232 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Robust t-statistics in brackets below each coefficient estimate. 
Results from instrumental variable regressions with non-federal life sciences funding as the dependent 
variable, and with the university-year as unit of observation.  All federal funding amounts are lagged one 
year.  All models include year fixed effects (shown) and university fixed effects. Standard errors are robust 
to heteroskedasticity and clustered on university. In addition to these analyses, we also investigated whether contemporaneous and lagged 
federal funding up to three years prior had significant impact on non-federal funding in the life 
sciences.  We chose a maximum lag of three years, because the average noncompeting duration 
for NIH awards is four years.  In a finite distributed lag model with university fixed effects, we 
find no evidence of substitution, i.e., none of the coefficients for federal funding are significant 
and negative.  Per Wooldridge (2009), the sum of the coefficients on contemporaneous and 
lagged federal R&D can be understood as the effect of a sustained increase in federal life 
sciences R&D funding to a university.  We find that a sustained one dollar increase in federal 
funding is associated with a $0.25 increase in non-federal funding for life sciences R&D 
(p=.0001). 
3.3  Validation of the IV model 
The above IV model will produce unbiased causal estimates of the impact of federal life 
sciences funding on non-federal life sciences funding, as long as our instrument satisfies two key 
assumptions: first, predicted NIH funding must be strongly correlated with actual federal life 
sciences funding; and second, predicted NIH funding must be uncorrelated with any unobserved 
time-varying university characteristics that impact non-federal life sciences funding.  The first 
assumption is testable, and we do so by computing the first-stage F-statistic for our instrument. 
However, the second assumption cannot be tested directly.  As noted in equation (4), variation in 
our instrument over time is based on the share of a university's funding received from a 
particular NIC in 1997 and differential growth in aggregate NIC budgets in the following years.  
University fixed effects control for differences in total NIH funding across universities in 1997, 
so the variation in our instrument arises only from year-to-year changes in the NIC budgets.  In 
essence, we predict higher NIH funding over time for universities that, in 1997, specialized in research areas funded by NICs which, in turn, experienced greater growth from 1998 through 
2006.  The validity of our second assumption relies on the following notions: (a) any shock to a 
given NIC's budget for a given year is uncorrelated with the amount of non-federal life sciences 
R&D funding a university would receive the following year, except to the extent that non-federal 
life sciences funding is itself dependent on NIH funding, and (b) university specialization in the 
base year is uncorrelated with other institutional characteristics that make the university more or 
less likely to obtain non-federal funding in later periods (e.g., institutional reputation).  We 
believe these are plausible assumptions, for the reasons discussed below. 
3.3.1  Determination of budgets for the National Institutes of Health is unlikely to be related to 
non-federal research priorities 
The National Institutes of Health provide extramural research funding to universities in 
all fifty states.  Each NIC specializes in specific diseases, aspects of human health and 
development, or research support, and each is funded by a separate Congressional appropriation.  
The U.S. Senate and House of Representatives have established parallel appropriations 
subcommittees that jointly determine the budget for the NICs, along with competing budgetary 
priorities in other health and human services agencies (e.g., the CDC), education, and labor. 
The appropriations cycle begins with the President's submission of a recommended 
budget to Congress.  The President's recommendations are accompanied by detailed justification 
statements from each federal agency, including from each of the NICs. Individual members of 
Congress then submit prioritized "wish lists" to the appropriations subcommittee based on 
requests from their constituents, including disease advocacy and general science lobby groups, 
academic institutions, etc. (Kennan, 2005). Both Congressional subcommittees hold hearings 
with testimony from NIC officials.  Once the subcommittees receive their spending ceilings, the 
House committee traditionally acts first to "mark up" an appropriation bill, and the Senate passes an amended version (for further discussion, see Streeter (2006)).  Thus, decisions on the portion 
of the budget designated for each NIC are made in response to political demands and perceived 
unmet public health needs (e.g., for bioterrorism-related research after 2001), but in tandem with 
funding decisions for unrelated aspects of labor and education due to their common spending 
cap.  After the House and Senate have passed their individual versions of the appropriations bill, 
differences are resolved in conference, resulting in a final product called the conference report.  
This conference report provides budget appropriations for each NIC, and may include additional 
non-binding "report language" encouraging the NICs to pursue research in particular areas or 
provide particular funding mechanisms.  Within each NIC, however, Congress has generally 
avoided specifying amounts for particular fields of research or funding mechanisms, and the 
number of such directives has also declined in recent years (Committee on the NIH Research 
Priority-Setting Process and Institute of Medicine, 1998). For example, the 2009 Omnibus 
Appropriations Bill directs the National Cancer Institute only in the naming of a surgical 
fellowship. 
Research priorities within each NIC (and, therefore, the amount of funding available to 
universities specializing in one research field versus another) are determined by the NIC in 
consultation with the Office of the Director. Decision-making with respect to funding particular 
proposals is highly decentralized, and funding levels by disease or specialized research area 
reflect not only the social and economic costs of particular diseases, but also the quality of 
investigator-initiated proposals received by each NIC and their potential for scientific progress. 
Thus, while it is certainly conceivable that technological opportunity or some other root cause 
might simultaneously increase both federal and non-federal funding for a particular disease (and 
thus potentially provide increased availability of both types of funding for a particular university), such within-NIC research priority shifts are unlikely to be reflected in the aggregate 
appropriation by Congress to a particular NIC. 
As a first test of this potential confounder, we generated an alternate measure of predicted 
NIH funding for university u in year t, based solely on each university's share of total NIH 
funding in the base year, and changes in total (aggregate) NIH funding over time.  Our results 
with this alternate instrument are essentially identical to the original IV approach: we find a 
dollar increase in federal life sciences funding results in a $0.36 increase in non-federal life 
sciences funding. 
Next, we investigated whether increases in NIH funding by institute were associated with 
contemporaneous increases in industry R&D for the diseases represented by each NIC.  The 
dependent variable for this analysis is industry R&D as measured by the number of drugs 
entering clinical trials for each disease category (matched to the relevant NIC, as presented in the 
Appendix) and year. Matching was based primarily on the lead NIC identified for each disease, 
as reported by the MedlinePlus website at the National Library of Medicine; however, this 
assignment was supplemented by analysis of the fraction of grants awarded by each NIC that 
were classified to each disease in 2006.  The algorithm for this classification is detailed in 
Blume-Kohout (2009).  For example, whereas the primary NIH organization for research on 
allergies is the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID), we found 
extramural research grants for respiratory allergies were more commonly funded by the National 
Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute (NHLBI), and so assigned treatments for respiratory allergies to 
that NIC. The key explanatory variable is log(NIC Budget) where the dollar amounts are 
adjusted by the Biomedical Research and Development Price Index (BRDPI). Due to evidence of moderate overdispersion, in lieu of Poisson we estimated an 
unconditional negative binomial model with NIC and year fixed effects. We found no significant 
relationship between NIH funding and contemporaneous pharmaceutical R&D (coefficient -.082, 
p=.833, with robust standard errors clustered on NIC).  Expressing NIC budget funding in levels 
rather than logs yielded very similar results.  These results support our assumption that shocks to 
universities' federal R&D funding due to changes in NIC budgets are unlikely to be accompanied 
by contemporaneous shocks to university funding from industry sources. 
3.3.2  University baseline shares are uncorrelated with other characteristics affecting 
likelihood of receiving non-federal funding 
The university baseline shares in 1997 used for our instrument are intended to indicate 
the specialization of each university across research fields, and research fields are strongly tied to 
particular NICs.  If universities with stronger research reputations, or other characteristics 
affecting their likelihood of receiving non-federal funding, specialized in research areas that 
were funded by the NICs that grew most rapidly after 1997, this could invalidate our instrument.  
To investigate this possibility, we tested whether the share of funding each university received 
from each NIC in the base year was correlated with other observable characteristics found to 
influence non-federal funding, including whether the university grants PhD degrees, whether the 
university is private or public, whether the university is ranked among the top 50 research 
universities in U.S. News and World Report, and how much funding the university received in 
fields other than life sciences during the sample period.  To implement this test, for each NIC we 
regressed the share of each university's NIH funding in 1997 awarded by that NIC on these 
university characteristics.  Applying the Bonferroni correction α/N for multiple regressions, 
where α = .05 and N represents the 22 NICs that funded universities in our panel in the base year, 
we find only one significant association between university characteristics and NIC funding share:  universities granting PhDs received disproportionately more funding from the National 
Cancer Institute in our base year than universities granting only bachelor's and master's degrees.  
Public versus private, top 50 versus unranked, and university non-life-sciences funding levels 
(both federal and non-federal) all had no impact on the share of funding universities received 
from each NIC. For the 21 other NICs, PhD-granting also had no significant impact.  
Finally, we tested whether our results are robust to using an earlier base year for our 
analysis. Doing so guards against the possibility that, based on information available about future 
funding changes, universities had already altered their specialization in the benchmark base year 
of 1997. Such anticipatory behavior is unlikely for a base year further removed from the sample 
period. To implement this test, we calculate NIC shares for each university in 1992 instead of 
1997, predict NIH funding for each university, and use this alternate measure of predicted NIH 
funding to instrument for federal life science funding. The results are almost identical to our 
main analysis: for example, we estimate $0.36 in non-federal funding per federal life sciences 
dollar (p<.001), with point elasticity (at the average) of 0.59.   
3.3.3  IV results show very little correlation between federal life sciences funding and non-
federal funding in seemingly unrelated fields 
As an additional validity check, we use our instrumental variables approach to test 
whether changes in federal life sciences funding were associated with changes in non-federal 
funding for other S&E fields including social sciences, psychology, computer science, 
engineering, physical sciences, mathematical sciences, and environmental sciences.  In principle, 
we should expect little relationship between federal life sciences funding and non-federal 
funding in these largely unrelated fields, provided our IV approach controls for differences in 
fundraising effort, university reputation, and other time-varying university characteristics.  To 
the extent there is spillover, we would expect it mainly in the other, non-life-sciences fields that NIH also funds.  In 2006, approximately 84% of NIH funding for basic and applied research at 
U.S. universities was for life sciences, 6% was for psychology, 3% was for engineering, 1.7% 
was for physical sciences, 1.4% was for environmental sciences, 1% was for social sciences, and 
less than 1% was for mathematical and computer sciences.
6  As expected, we find little causal 
relationship between federal life science funding (using the predicted NIH funding instrument) 
and non-federal funding in these fields, The only significant effects found were for non-federal 
social sciences funding (1.8 cents per federal dollar), physical sciences (1.3 cents per federal 
dollar), environmental sciences (0.7 cents per federal dollar), and mathematics (0.2 cents per 
federal dollar), generally tracking the NIH funding levels described above, and much lower than 
the 33-cent increase seen for non-federal life sciences funding.  The sole exception to this pattern 
was for social sciences research, which may simply reflect differences in overall availability of 
nonfederal funding for social sciences versus other fields. 
3.3.4  Inclusion of time-varying university rankings has no impact on our results 
If our IV approach were invalid, then changes in the quality or reputation of a university 
over time would likely impact both federal and non-federal funding, confounding our results.  To 
test for this possibility, we include as a covariate the U.S. News and World Report rank, year-by-
year, for each university in our panel that at some point during the sample period was ranked 
among the top 50 national universities.
7  Changes in university rank over time had no impact on 
our estimate, and the coefficient on rank was insignificant (robust t-statistic 0.38), suggesting 
that university fixed effects coupled with our IV approach are adequate to describe the impact of 
university ranking on R&D funding. 4.  Discussion 
As discussed above, the effect of public (federal) research funding on private or non-
federal funding is an issue of much debate.  A priori, there could be a negative (substitution) 
effect, either due to crowding out of private investment or because researchers could stop 
seeking other sources of funding once they receive federal funding.  On the other hand, federal 
R&D funding could also have a positive impact due to complementarity or signaling effects.  
Careful empirical analysis is needed to parse these opposing effects. 
In a panel of 272 U.S. universities, with data on federal and non-federal life sciences 
R&D funding spanning nearly a decade, we find that increased federal funding is associated with 
increased non-federal funding.  This result is robust to econometric specifications that correct for 
omitted latent variables that could be responsible for increases in both types of funding.  Our 
evidence also suggests that, in addition to providing support for research, successful applications 
for federal life sciences funding may be interpreted by private and non-federal organizations as a 
signal of the quality of the recipient institutions.  Less research-focused universities (i.e., those 
not granting PhDs in S&E fields), and those that historically received lower levels of federal and 
non-federal funding appear to experience greater increases in non-federal funding for each 
federal dollar received.  This is consistent with the observation by Payne (2001) that federal 
organizations such as the NIH may serve to correct asymmetries in information between 
universities and their prospective non-federal funders. 
Our result is also qualitatively similar to that found by Diamond (1999), who used 
aggregate, annual time series data from 1953-1995 to study the connection between federal and 
private spending on basic research in science.  However, his estimate is quantitatively much 
lower than ours: he found that a dollar increase in federal spending was associated with only an additional $0.08 in academic spending, compared with $0.33 in our analysis.  Our use of the 
university as a unit of analysis, and reliance on cross-sectional as well as time-series variation (as 
opposed to aggregate time-series variation alone) might partly account for this difference. 
By enabling universities to attract more private resources, federal life sciences R&D 
funding may also influence the eventual commercialization of university research.  However, to 
understand the mechanisms by which federal funding results in commercial products such as 
life-saving drugs, one should look at broader outcomes such as university patenting and licensing 
behavior, and alliances between universities and the private sector.  Qualitative research with 
not-for-profit foundations and other non-federal funders could serve to confirm the suggested 
signaling effect; however, a more structural approach is needed to disentangle this effect from 
complementarity between federal and non-federal funds in the production of knowledge.  These 
are subjects for our future research. Notes
                                                 
1   Federal obligations for biological, medical, and life sciences not elsewhere classified totaled 
83.5% of NIH funding to universities and colleges.  Data are based on author's calculations 
using the NSF Survey of Federal Funds for Research and Development, available at: 
http://caspar.nsf.gov/ 
2 We are very grateful to Bhaven Sampat at Columbia University who provided us with analytic 
data files extracted from NIH administrative records for years 1997-2003, including the 
financial amount of each award, and to Pierre Azoulay who provided a list of NIH grantee 
organizations coded by type (e.g., institutions of higher education).  These data were obtained 
via FOIA requests. Data for years 2004-2006 were downloaded from the NIH website at: 
http://www.report.nih.gov/award/awardtr.cfm 
3 The NSF estimated total life sciences R&D expenditures at U.S. universities and colleges as 
  $28.8 billion in 2006.  See: http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/nsf08300/pdf/tab4.pdf 
4 While the linear model does exhibit increasing variance in the residuals with higher levels of 
non-federal funding, there is no evidence of any upward or downward trend suggesting 
misspecification, and log transformation of the financial amounts appears to overcorrect rather 
than stabilize the variance.  Thus, the data do not recommend log transformation, our estimates 
should be both unbiased and consistent except as discussed above, and the observed 
heteroskedasticity can be accommodated simply by our calculation of robust standard errors.  
We calculate robust clustered standard errors for the instrumental variables models using 
XTIVREG2 (Schaffer, 2005). 
5 Despite our misgivings about this alternate specification, we did nonetheless estimate each of 
our models described above for this restricted panel, using log-transformed financial amounts.   
For models (1)-(3), we find significant positive coefficients (p<.01) ranging from 0.925 for 
model (1) to 0.492 for model (3).  However, for this restricted panel of institutions already 
receiving non-zero federal and non-federal funding both for life sciences and for other S&E 
fields, the instrumental variables approach with constant-elasticity specification indicates no 
significant impact of lagged federal life sciences funding on non-federal life sciences funding.  
Rather, for these institutions, receipt of non-federal life sciences funding appears to be most 
strongly and significantly correlated with the university's contemporaneous successes in 
attracting non-federal funding for other science and engineering fields. 
6 Estimates for NIH obligations to U.S. universities for basic and applied research, by field, are 
taken from the NSF's Survey of Federal Funds for Research and Development. 
7 Historical rankings were obtained from the Chronicle of Higher Education website, accessed 
April 23, 2009, at: http://chronicle.com/stats/usnews.  Forty universities in our panel had 
ranking data available for at least 8 out of 9 panel-years. References 
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Appendix.  Crosswalk between Pharmaprojects therapeutic codes and primary NIH Institutes, page 1 of 5 
Pharmaprojects Therapeutic  Category  NIH  Institute 
A10B  Antidiabetic  National Institute of Diabetes and Digestive and Kidney Diseases (NIDDK) 
A10C  Symptomatic antidiabetic  National Institute of Diabetes and Digestive and Kidney Diseases (NIDDK) 
A11A  Nutritional supplement  Not Assigned 
A14  Anabolic  National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke (NINDS) 
A15  Appetite stimulant  National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke (NINDS) 
A16  GI inflammatory/bowel disorders  National Institute of Diabetes and Digestive and Kidney Diseases (NIDDK) 
A17  Metabolic and enzyme disorders  National Institute of Diabetes and Digestive and Kidney Diseases (NIDDK) 
A18Z  Alimentary/Metabolic, other  National Institute of Diabetes and Digestive and Kidney Diseases (NIDDK) 
A1A  Stomatological  National Institute of Dental and Craniofacial Research (NIDCR) 
A2A  Antacid/Antiflatulent  National Institute of Diabetes and Digestive and Kidney Diseases (NIDDK) 
A2B  Antiulcer  National Institute of Diabetes and Digestive and Kidney Diseases (NIDDK) 
A3  Antispasmodic  National Institute of Diabetes and Digestive and Kidney Diseases (NIDDK) 
A4A  Antiemetic  National Cancer Institute (NCI) 
A4B  Gastroprokinetic  National Institute of Diabetes and Digestive and Kidney Diseases (NIDDK) 
A5B  Hepatoprotective  National Institute of Diabetes and Digestive and Kidney Diseases (NIDDK) 
A5D  Gallstone therapy  National Institute of Diabetes and Digestive and Kidney Diseases (NIDDK) 
A6  Laxative  National Institute of Diabetes and Digestive and Kidney Diseases (NIDDK) 
A7  Antidiarrhoeal  National Institute of Diabetes and Digestive and Kidney Diseases (NIDDK) 
A8A3  Anorectic/Antiobesity  National Institute of Diabetes and Digestive and Kidney Diseases (NIDDK) 
A9  Digestive  National Institute of Diabetes and Digestive and Kidney Diseases (NIDDK) 
B1A  Anticoagulant  National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute (NHLBI) 
B1B1  Fibrinolytic  National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute (NHLBI) 
B1B9  Antithrombotic  National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute (NHLBI) 
B2A  Antifibrinolytic  National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute (NHLBI) 
B2B  Haemostatic  National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute (NHLBI) 
B3C1  Antisickling  National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute (NHLBI) 
B3C9  Antianaemic  National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute (NHLBI) 
B5A1  Plasma substitute  National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute (NHLBI) 
B5A2  Blood fraction  National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute (NHLBI) 
B6A  Septic shock treatment  National lnstitute of General Medical Sciences (NIGMS) 
B7Z  Haematological  National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute (NHLBI)  
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C10 Hypolipaemic/Antiatherosclerosis  National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute (NHLBI) 
C1B  Antiarrhythmic  National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute (NHLBI) 
C1C1  Cardiostimulant  National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute (NHLBI) 
C1D1  Vasodilator, coronary  National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute (NHLBI) 
C1D3  Antianginal  National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute (NHLBI) 
C2B1 Antihypertensive,  adrenergic  National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute (NHLBI) 
C2B2  Antihypertensive, renin system  National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute (NHLBI) 
C2B6 Antihypertensive,  diuretic  National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute (NHLBI) 
C2B9 Antihypertensive,  other National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute (NHLBI) 
C4A Vasodilator,  peripheral  National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute (NHLBI) 
C4B  Vasodilator, renal  National Institute of Diabetes and Digestive and Kidney Diseases (NIDDK) 
C5A  Vasoprotective, topical  National Institute on Aging (NIA) 
C5C Vasoprotective,  systemic  National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute (NHLBI) 
C6C  Hypertensive  National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute (NHLBI) 
C9Z  Cardiovascular  National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute (NHLBI) 
D10A  Antiacne  National Institute of Arthritis and Musculoskeletal and Skin Diseases (NIAMS) 
D11Z  Dermatological  National Institute of Arthritis and Musculoskeletal and Skin Diseases (NIAMS) 
D3A  Vulnerary  National Institute of Arthritis and Musculoskeletal and Skin Diseases (NIAMS) 
D4A  Antipruritic/inflamm, allergic  National Institute of Arthritis and Musculoskeletal and Skin Diseases (NIAMS) 
D4B  Antipruritic/inflamm, non-allergic  National Institute of Arthritis and Musculoskeletal and Skin Diseases (NIAMS) 
D5A  Antipsoriasis  National Institute of Arthritis and Musculoskeletal and Skin Diseases (NIAMS) 
G1C  Fertility enhancer  National Institute of Child Health & Human Development (NICHD) 
G2A  Labour inducer  National Institute of Child Health & Human Development (NICHD) 
G2B  Labour inhibitor  National Institute of Child Health & Human Development (NICHD) 
G3A  Menstruation disorders  National Institute of Child Health & Human Development (NICHD) 
G3B  Menopausal disorders  National Institute on Aging (NIA) 
G3C Female  contraceptive National  Institute  of Child Health & Human Development (NICHD) 
G3D  Abortifacient  National Institute of Child Health & Human Development (NICHD) 
G4Z  Urological  National Institute of Diabetes and Digestive and Kidney Diseases (NIDDK) 
G5A  Prostate disorders  National Institute of Diabetes and Digestive and Kidney Diseases (NIDDK) 
G5B  Male sexual dysfunction  National Institute of Diabetes and Digestive and Kidney Diseases (NIDDK)  
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G5C  Male contraceptive  National Institute of Child Health & Human Development (NICHD) 
G6Z  Reproductive/gonadal, general  National Institute of Child Health & Human Development (NICHD) 
H1A  ACTH  National Institute of Diabetes and Digestive and Kidney Diseases (NIDDK) 
H3A  Thyroid hormone  National Institute of Diabetes and Digestive and Kidney Diseases (NIDDK) 
H3B  Antithyroid  National Institute of Diabetes and Digestive and Kidney Diseases (NIDDK) 
H4B  Prostaglandin  National Institute of Diabetes and Digestive and Kidney Diseases (NIDDK) 
H4C  Releasing hormone  National Institute of Diabetes and Digestive and Kidney Diseases (NIDDK) 
H4D2  Antiprolactin  National Institute of Diabetes and Digestive and Kidney Diseases (NIDDK) 
H4E1  Insulin  National Institute of Diabetes and Digestive and Kidney Diseases (NIDDK) 
H4E2  Glucagon  National Institute of Diabetes and Digestive and Kidney Diseases (NIDDK) 
H4F1  Growth hormone  National Institute of Diabetes and Digestive and Kidney Diseases (NIDDK) 
H4F2  Somatostatin  National Institute of Diabetes and Digestive and Kidney Diseases (NIDDK) 
H4Z  Hormone  National Institute of Diabetes and Digestive and Kidney Diseases (NIDDK) 
I1A  Immunostimulant, anti-AIDS  National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) 
I1Z  Immunostimulant, other  National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) 
I2  Cytokine  National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) 
I4A2  Immunoglobulin, non-MAb  National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) 
I5  Immunosuppressant  National Institute of Arthritis and Musculoskeletal and Skin Diseases (NIAMS) 
I6Z Immunological  Not  Assigned 
J1A  Tetracycline  National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) 
J1C1  Penicillin, oral  National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) 
J1C2  Penicillin, injectable  National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) 
J1D1  Cephalosporin, oral  National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) 
J1D2  Cephalosporin, injectable  National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) 
J1E  Trimethoprim and analogues  National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) 
J1F  Macrolide antibiotic  National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) 
J1L  Aminoglycoside antibiotic  National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) 
J1M  Peptide antibiotic  National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) 
J1N  Beta-lactam antibiotic  National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) 
J1Z  Antibiotic, other  National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) 
J2A  Antifungal  National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID)  
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J3C  Quinolone antibacterial  National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) 
J3Z  Antibacterial, other  National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) 
J4A  Antimycobacterial  National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) 
J5A  Antiviral, anti-HIV  National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) 
J5B  Antiviral, interferon  National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) 
J5Z  Antiviral, other  National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) 
J7A1 Prophylactic  vaccine  National  Institute  of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) 
J7A2  Therapeutic vaccine  National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) 
J7B  Immunomodulator, anti-infective  National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) 
J8Z  Anti-infective, other  National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) 
K1A  Anticancer, antibiotic  National Cancer Institute (NCI) 
K1B  Anticancer, alkylating  National Cancer Institute (NCI) 
K1C  Anticancer, antimetabolite  National Cancer Institute (NCI) 
K2  Anticancer, hormonal  National Cancer Institute (NCI) 
K3  Anticancer, immunological  National Cancer Institute (NCI) 
K4 Anticancer,  interferon  National Cancer Institute (NCI) 
K5A  Radio/chemosensitizer  National Cancer Institute (NCI) 
K5B  Radio/chemoprotective  National Cancer Institute (NCI) 
K6Z  Anticancer, other  National Cancer Institute (NCI) 
M1A1  Anti-inflammatory  National Institute of Arthritis and Musculoskeletal and Skin Diseases (NIAMS) 
M1A2  Anti-inflammatory, topical  National Institute of Arthritis and Musculoskeletal and Skin Diseases (NIAMS) 
M2C  Antiarthritic, immunological  National Institute of Arthritis and Musculoskeletal and Skin Diseases (NIAMS) 
M2Z  Antiarthritic, other  National Institute of Arthritis and Musculoskeletal and Skin Diseases (NIAMS) 
M3  Muscle relaxant  National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke (NINDS) 
M4A  Antigout  National Institute of Arthritis and Musculoskeletal and Skin Diseases (NIAMS) 
M5A  Osteoporosis treatment  National Institute of Arthritis and Musculoskeletal and Skin Diseases (NIAMS) 
M5Z  Musculoskeletal  National Institute of Arthritis and Musculoskeletal and Skin Diseases (NIAMS) 
N10A Antidepressant  National  Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) 
N11Z  Neurological  National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) 
N1A1  Anaesthetic, inhalation  National Institute of General Medical Sciences (NIGMS) 
N1A2  Anaesthetic, injectable  National Institute of General Medical Sciences (NIGMS)  
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N1B  Anaesthetic, local  National Institute of General Medical Sciences (NIGMS) 
N2B  Analgesic, NSAID  National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke (NINDS) 
N2Z  Analgesic, other  National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke (NINDS) 
N3A  Antiepileptic  National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke (NINDS) 
N4A  Antiparkinsonian  National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke (NINDS) 
N5A1  Neuroleptic  National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) 
N5B Hypnotic/Sedative  National  Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) 
N5C  Anxiolytic  National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) 
N5D  Antineurotic  National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) 
N6B  Psychostimulant  National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) 
N6D  Cognition enhancer  National Institute on Aging (NIA) 
N7A  Multiple sclerosis treatment  National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke (NINDS) 
N7C  Neuroprotective  National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke (NINDS) 
N8A  Antimigraine  National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke (NINDS) 
N9A Dependence  treatment  National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) 
P1A  Amoebicide  National Eye Institute (NEI) 
P1B  Anthelmintic  National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) 
P1C  Schistosomicide  National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) 
P1D  Antimalarial  National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) 
P1G  Protozoacide  National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) 
P1Z  Parasiticide  National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) 
R3A  Lung Surfactant  National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute (NHLBI) 
R4A  COPD treatment  National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute (NHLBI) 
R4B  Cystic fibrosis treatment  National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute (NHLBI) 
R5D  Antitussive  National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute (NHLBI) 
R8A  Antiasthma  National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute (NHLBI) 
R8B  Antiallergic, non-asthma  National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute (NHLBI) 
R9A Respiratory  stimulant  National  Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute (NHLBI) 
R9Z Respiratory  National  Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute (NHLBI) 
S1G  Antiglaucoma  National Eye Institute (NEI) 
S1Z  Ophthalmological  National Eye Institute (NEI) 
S2  Otological  National Institute on Deafness and Other Communication Disorders (NIDCD) 